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Smallholder farmers in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) face many
obstacles that make it diﬃcult for them to increase their income
and improve their food security. One major problem is that
many smallholder farmers sell their maize immediately after
harvest, rather than making the eﬀort to preserve grain of good
quality for later in the season when it may fetch a higher price.
One reason why this occurs is because many smallholders must
deal with a binding liquidity constraint at harvest to pay for
immediate needs like school fees that makes the need for cash
at harvest imperative (Renkow, 1990; Saha & Stroud, 1994;
Stephens & Barrett, 2011). The second reason for early sale is
that without access to eﬀective and aﬀordable storage technol-
ogy, grain placed in storage may experience substantial damage
from post-harvest pests, such as insects, rodents, and mold.
Pests are major impediments to grain storage and household
food security that create two problems. First, pest damage
reduces the quantity available for households to sell and con-
sume later in the year. Second, farmers potentially receive a
price discount for lower quality damaged grain that is mar-
keted. Markets in developed countries have explicit standards
for maize quality and discount schedules that give price
penalties to visibly damaged maize. However, formal quality
standards do not exist in most rural maize markets in SSA,
which is where most of the maize transactions in the region
take place.
Despite its importance, the issue of possible quality premi-
ums or damage discounts for maize in informal rural markets
has received limited attention in the literature. In a recent
meta-analysis of post-harvest loss in SSA, Aﬀognon,
Mutungi, Sanginga, and Borgemeister (2015) cite quality loss
in the post-harvest as one of the major problems that has
yet to be fully understood or quantiﬁed. This is an important
issue because as noted in Hodges, Buzby, and Bennett (2011,
p. 43), ‘‘successful markets depend on a consistent supply of
better-quality produce.” Furthermore, Jones, Alexander, and
Lowenberg-Deboer (2014) develop a ﬁnancial model for mea-
suring proﬁtability of storage that includes quality loss. They
conclude that when quality losses are considered in an eco-
nomic analysis of the returns to storing maize, the ‘‘total value
loss” can far exceed traditional estimates that only consider
quantity of maize lost in storage.115With these considerations in mind, the objective of this arti-
cle is to estimate the extent to which insect damage aﬀects the
price that smallholder farm households in SSA receive and pay
for maize in rural markets. We test two main hypotheses that
to our knowledge remain largely unanswered to date. The ﬁrst
(null) hypothesis is: there is no statistically signiﬁcant price
discount for maize that has been damaged by insects. If markets
in SSA do not place a premium on high quality maize (dis-
count damaged maize), this can help explain why poor quality
maize exists, which has negative implications for household
food security and health.
The second (null) hypothesis is: the average price discount is
the same in the early post-harvest period and lean period for
maize with the same level of damage. Markets may value
quality and thus discount damaged maize in the period
immediately following harvest, when quantity is plentiful
and is generally of high quality. However, in the lean period
maize becomes scarce and quality may become less important
as people must eat what is available regardless of insect
damage.
This article uses data from a random sample of 360 small-
holder maize farmers conducted across Benin after the
2011–12 harvest. We conduct a straightforward experiment
showing farmers maize with diﬀerent levels of insect damage
to test the two hypotheses presented above. We ﬁrst ask farm-
ers the price per kilogram and level of insect damage for the
maize that constituted their largest maize sale and purchase
in the past post-harvest season. Second, we ask farmers to
value maize at each damage level for purchase and sale. Our
estimates include a parsimonious speciﬁcation that includes
only the level of insect damage as a control, and a full
speciﬁcation that incorporates other household-level, and
market-level factors, along with information about transac-
tion partners as control variables. Since some farmers do not
sell (buy) maize because they price they receive (pay) is below
(above) their reservation value, we have a number of missing
values for maize price in our experiment. We deal with this
potential selection bias issue caused by farmers not buying
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tion method, following Heckman (1979).
To our knowledge this article is the ﬁrst study to empirically
quantify price discounts for damaged maize using revealed
preference data from smallholder farmers in SSA. In doing
so, it makes three contributions to the literature. First, we
obtain quantitative estimates of maize damage discounts for
a representative sample of smallholder maize farmers regard-
less of how long they store their maize. Many of these farmers
are both producers and consumers of maize so we ask them
how they value damaged maize when they operate on each side
of the market. Second, we compare the results from past-
transactions (revealed preference) with those from farmers’
perceptions (stated preference) about the eﬀects of insect
damage on maize prices. We use these two methods to com-
pare the accuracy of each estimation approach. Third, for sale
and purchase transactions, we test whether the price discounts
for damaged maize are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent between the time
period immediately after harvest and the lean season.
Previous literature suggests that there may be unoﬃcial
price discounts for insect damage in West African cowpea
markets (Langyintuo, Ntoukam, Murdock, Lowenberg-
DeBoer, & Miller, 2004). However, there is limited
information on possible insect damage discounts for maize,
and virtually no information at the farmer-level. To our
knowledge the only published study in Africa by Compton
et al. (1998) uses trader focus groups in Ghana to construct
a maize discount schedule based on stated preferences.
Hoﬀmann and Gatobu (2014) survey a population of Kenyan
farmers who store maize for longer than six months. The
authors use an experimental auction and conclude that asym-
metric information about unobservable maize attributes such
as the existence of aﬂatoxins may also contribute to the
prevalence of smallholder autarky in staple grains.
Our study complements and extends the work by Hoﬀman
and Gatobu, as we believe maize prices should reﬂect
observable quality during market transactions. We focus on
potential discounts for maize with diﬀerent levels of insect
damage and how those discounts may be diﬀerent between
the early post-harvest period and the lean period.
The rest of this article is organized as follows. The next
section describes how data collection and the experiment were
conducted in the selected areas. Subsequent sections present
the empirical estimation, results, and conclusions.2. MAIZE MARKETING IN BENIN
Private sector trading among farmers and traders dominates
the maize marketing system in Benin. However, the govern-
ment still intervenes in cereal markets. The national oﬃce
for food security called ‘‘Oﬃce National d’Appui a la Securite
Alimentaire (ONASA)” buys and stores maize and other cere-
als to resell between harvests to smooth out market supplies
and limit price surges.
Smallholder farmers buy and sell maize in local rural
markets, and occasionally in larger district markets. There is
no formal quality control mechanism in these markets, so
market participants implement their own practices to verify
maize quality. Most traders prefer to purchase maize during
the harvest season and the early post-harvest period, when
prices are lowest and good quality grain is abundant. They
build up their stocks to take advantage of spatial and temporal
price arbitrage that occurs later in the season. Wholesale
traders assemble maize from diﬀerent rural and district
markets to resell it in regional or urban markets.During harvest and early post-harvest period, maize is fresh
and of good quality so the risk of damaged grain being con-
cealed in bags is low. Indeed, many wholesale traders often
only sample a certain portion of the maize they purchase to
check for quality. They may also hire middlemen in rural areas
to collect and ensure that good quality maize is being pur-
chased.
Wholesale traders buy maize during the lean period only
when there is acute demand in the consumer markets. How-
ever, retail traders represent more constant market partners
for farmers, since they operate in local and district markets
throughout the seasons. Women are the main retail maize
traders across rural markets in Benin, just as in other West
African countries. Retail traders buy diﬀerent amounts of
maize from farmers and resell it out of their small shops or
kiosks to other rural dwellers and farm households who run
out of their own produced maize stocks.
Quality control is less of a challenge for market participants
when small quantities of maize are traded, as is often the case
when smallholders buy and sell maize in the lean period. When
the traded quantity is small, it is relatively easy for farmers and
traders to determine observable maize characteristics through
visual controls and touching maize contained in bags and bas-
kets. It is important to note that market participants can only
judge maize quality based on its observable characteristics and
do not have the means to test for unobservable characteristics
that could be harmful to them, such as the maize being con-
taminated with aﬂatoxin.3. DATA
Data used in this study come from a random survey con-
ducted from July to August 2012 in Benin. We selected six
departments out of 12 in Benin using multiple criteria of
agricultural productivity, food security, and geographical
repartition. Two counties called ‘‘Sous-Prefecture” were then
randomly chosen in each department, followed by the random
selection of one district in each identiﬁed county. The villages
for farmer interviews were also randomly chosen in each dis-
trict. In a ﬁnal step we randomly selected 30 farmers from a
census of maize farmers from each village. In total 360 farmers
were interviewed, but we retain 357 observations because two
farmers did not store maize and one farmer was an outlier with
a quantity produced far above (51 times) the average produc-
tion of other farmers, and thus cannot be considered a
smallholder.
The number of respondents diﬀers depending on the evalu-
ation method that is used. Only farmers who were involved in
market transactions during the past post-harvest season were
interviewed for the revealed preference (RP) evaluation. There
were 246 farmers who sold maize (69% of the sample) and 134
(37% of the sample) who purchased maize. All 357 farmers
were asked to elicit their preferences for a range of maize qual-
ities for the stated preference (SP) evaluation.
In each sampled village the survey started with a focus
group discussion. These focus groups were composed of
10–15 male and female maize farmers from the selected vil-
lages. The enumerators explained the purpose of the study
to participants, and participants helped to evaluate how real-
istic the damage levels that we presented were for marketed
maize in the village. In addition, the focus group participants
were asked to diﬀerentiate the major periods in the season
when price and quality vary, to capture local market condi-
tions. In summary, shortly after the harvest, maize prices are
relatively low and the quality and quantity are generally high.
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maize becomes scarce, and the available maize is likely of
lower quality than just after harvest, while at the same time
prices are high. For the purpose of the analysis, we distinguish
between an early post-harvest (PH) period and a lean period
during the post-harvest season, which is the season after ﬁnal
storage on the farm has been made (see Figure 1).
We set up the experiment by ﬁlling clear plastic boxes with
maize that represented ﬁve diﬀerent levels of insect damage:
0%, 10%, 20%, 30%, and 50%. Only insect damage was exam-
ined among maize attributes, and was allowed to vary by these
ﬁve levels. Other attributes such as mold content, color, and
variety were identical and held constant across samples. Each
enumerator had ﬁve boxes of the diﬀerent levels of damage
that they showed to farmers. The farmers were not told what
level of damage they were looking at, and the boxes of diﬀer-
ent damage levels were placed in a random order that was
known to the enumerator for recording purposes, but not to
the responding farmer.
In the revealed preference approach, farmers were asked to
choose among the maize samples and pick the one box out of
the ﬁve possible options that was closest in level of damage to
the maize that constituted their largest sale and/or purchase
transaction during the past post-harvest season. Farmers were
then asked to report the transaction price in F CFA/kg for the
chosen maize quality. Other characteristics of the household
such as demographic information, annual income, and savings
were also recorded during the interview.
In the stated preference experiment, farmers were asked to
state how much they would pay and accept for each level of
maize quality that they were shown. Each respondent was
shown all ﬁve samples in random order, so ﬁve responses were
recorded for each person interviewed. 1
We designed the SP survey to minimize measurement error
and insure validity of the estimates by following recommenda-
tions in Carson (2000) for implementing contingent valuation
interviews. First, interviews were made in one-on-one settings
with only the enumerator and the farmer. Second, identical
boxes of diﬀerent maize damage levels were shown to each
respondent and they were allowed to touch the maize to
evaluate the quality. Third, the respondent elicited his or her
preference by stating a price for a given quality in the experi-
mental transaction. In addition, the respondent was free to
state a zero value as price when he or she was not willing to
purchase the good. Fourth, respondents were asked about
their willingness-to-pay (WTP) and willingness-to-accept
(WTA) during the lean period, as it is the most realistic period
for poor quality maize. 2SEASON
Beginning of Harvest 
Season  & Storage 
End of Harvest / Final 
Storage Decision Made 
Low P         Low Price
Figure 1. Maize consum4. EMPIRICAL ESTIMATION
(a) Empirical speciﬁcation of the revealed preference models
We build our empirical model upon a hedonic price from
Lancaster (1966) and Rosen (1974). Rosen (1974) states that
under competitive market conditions, implicit prices will
normally be related to product attributes alone, without
accounting for producer or supplier attributes. However, rural
markets from SSA are rarely competitive, and several
empirical studies have shown that prices are also related to the
attributes of buyers, sellers, and markets (Dury & Meuriot,
2010; Langyintuo et al., 2004; Parker & Zilberman, 1993).
Hence, we deﬁne an implicit form of the empirical model for
factors aﬀecting maize price for a household (i) as follows:
P i ¼ f ðDi;M i;F i;T i; liÞ ð1Þ
where the dependent variable P denotes the market price,
which is the sale price when a farmer sells maize and the
purchase price when he or she buys maize.
The main covariate of interest is measured through D, which
denotes the levels of the visible characteristic, insect damage.
Through focus group discussions in Ghana, Compton et al.
(1998) reveal that insect damage has an impact on maize price.
In the present application, the vector D is treated under two
forms. First, it is a set of dummy variables that correspond
to the level of insect damage. These dummy variables are
10%, 20%, 30% and 50% with base 0% damage. The ﬁrst four
levels of damage follow Compton et al. (1998) who indicate
the categories called undamaged, slightly damaged, and badly
damaged. By adding 50% damage, we extend Compton et al.
(1998) with an additional level of insect damage to identify a
probable rejection value for maize quality in the market.
Second, in an alternative speciﬁcation, D also represents a
continuous variable that takes as values the level of insect
damage. The marginal eﬀect of D on price tests hypothesis
one: there is no statistically signiﬁcant price discount for maize
that has been damaged by insects.
The vectorM corresponds to market variables, which allows
us to diﬀerentiate how maize quality may be valued in diﬀerent
market settings. For instance, normally there is a much higher
prevalence of insect-damaged maize during the lean period
compared to the early post-harvest period. Therefore we
include a dummy variable = 1 when the market transaction
occurs in the lean period, so that we can compare price
discounts between that period and the early post-harvest
period. We also include an interaction between level of insect
damage, D, and the lean period dummy. The joint statisticalNew Harvest 
rice = Early PH High Price = Lean 
Beginning of Lean Period: 
-May/June in the South & Center 
- July/August in the North 
ption cycle in Benin.
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tests the second hypothesis in this study: the average price dis-
count is the same in the early post-harvest period and lean period
for maize with the same level of damage.
In addition, we incorporate the distance from market in
kilometers within the vector M. Farmers farther from the
market might place a lower valuation on maize quality than
farmers closer to the market due to transaction and storage
costs, and constraints to access market information. We also
introduce the department dummies to control for regional
diﬀerences in insect infestation and price patterns.
The vector F represents a set of household characteristics.
We include demographic variables along with determinants
of a farmer’s market participation. We consider determinants
such as (i) age of household head, (ii) education of household
head, and (iii) household size. We then add (iv) a farmer’s full
income from activities other than maize production and (v)
saving at the beginning of the harvest season. These two
variables capture a household’s liquidity constraints that
may hinder market participation (Stephens & Barrett, 2011).
We also assume that better information about market prices
and the quality of maize traded depend on the degree to which
a farmer participates in markets either as a seller or a buyer.
Thus, we consider the variables (vi) total quantity of maize
traded by the household in the post-harvest period, (vii) the
share of production that is sold to measure the household’s
propensity to sell maize, and (viii) the share of maize
purchased for consumption relative to quantity of maize pro-
duced by the household to infer their propensity to buy maize.
The vector T denotes a household’s trading partner during
the transaction, namely maize buyers for sales, and maize
sellers for purchases. For the sale model the vector comprises
the following set of dummy variables: (1) farmers in the
village, (2) traders from the market, (3) governmental grain
marketing agency called ONASA, and (4) ‘‘other buyers”
which serves as the base in the sales transaction. For the pur-
chase model, we use ‘‘traders” as the base.
(b) Dealing with potential omitted variable bias in the revealed
preference models
It is possible that unobserved factors in the error term of
Eqn. (1) of the RP models, denoted by li, that aﬀect the
dependent variable maize price, also aﬀect maize quality. If
this is the case then omitted variables could lead to biased
estimates of the maize damage coeﬃcients. To indirectly test
and deal with the impacts of omitted variable bias, we present
a parsimonious speciﬁcation for each of our estimated models
that only includes level of insect damage, department
dummies, and a constant as covariates. Results of the parsi-
monious speciﬁcation are presented next to results where a full
set of observable household, season, and market characteris-
tics are in the model, as explained in Eqn. (1). There is little
change in the insect damage coeﬃcient estimates between the
parsimonious and fully speciﬁed speciﬁcations. This lends
validity to the notion that omitted variables are not biasing
the insect damage coeﬃcient estimates in this study.
(c) Functional form in the revealed preference models
Most hedonic price models rely on the Box–Cox transfor-
mation to identify the correct functional form, as there is no
theoretical background to support the functional form of
the dependent variable. The Box–Cox transformation of the
dependent variable conﬁrms the semi-log form for the sale
model, but it indicates a simple linear form for the purchasemodel. To test the robustness of the estimates, we use a log-
linear speciﬁcation for the dependent variable along with a
simple linear regression. The log-linear regression is applied
only when the covariate D is treated as a continuous variable
representing the level of insect damage.
(d) Dealing with potential sample selection issues in the revealed
preference models
Since only a sub-sample of households in our full sample actu-
ally purchase and/or sell maize, we may encounter selection bias
in our estimation of factors aﬀecting maize price. This occurs
because some households do not sell (purchase) maize because
the price they would receive (pay) is below (above) their reserva-
tion value for that maize. Therefore, the value of that maize is
unobservable to us (it is not equal to zero), and failure to
accurately correct for this problem can lead to biased coeﬃcient
estimates (see Wooldridge (2010) for discussion of this problem,
which he calls incidental truncation).
Our problem is analogous to the common empirical situa-
tion where one needs to correct for labor market participation
when estimating a wage equation. We test and correct for this
concern using a two-step estimation of Heckman selection
model, following Heckman (1979). In this context, the ﬁrst
step is the selection equation that corresponds to the
household’s decision to participate in markets for each type
of transaction (sale or purchase). We then derive the inverse
mills ratio (IMR) from the selection equation and include it
as an additional covariate in the maize price equation as
shown in Eqn. (1). The statistical signiﬁcance of the IMR in
the second step tells us if selection bias is an issue under the
null hypothesis that there is no selection bias.
We use total area cultivated to crops other than maize as our
exclusion variable in the participation equation. This variable
is appropriate because households with larger non-maize areas
may be more likely to sell and less likely to purchase maize.
However, this variable would not be expected to directly aﬀect
maize price.
Table 8 in the Appendix presents the results when the Heck-
man selection model is used to estimate the revealed preference
maize price equation. The exclusion variable is signiﬁcant in
the ﬁrst stage participation models for both purchases and
sales (p-value <0.05), indicating that it is suitable to identify
the equation. In the second stage, the IMR is insigniﬁcant in
the maize price model for sales (p-value = 0.94), suggesting
that selection bias is not an issue. The IMR is statistically
signiﬁcant in the maize price models for purchases
(p-value = 0.00). However, the statistical signiﬁcance of the
coeﬃcients on insect damage and lean season variables do
not change when the IMR is included compared to the main
results when it is not. This suggests that selection bias is not
a major empirical concern in this setting.
(e) Empirical speciﬁcation of the stated preference models
The stated preference model in our study uses a contingent
valuation (CV) method. The CV method is very straightfor-
ward, and since we are interested in only one characteristic
of the good, its level of insect damage, this method is
widely accepted as valid (Bateman et al., 2002). In this appli-
cation, we measure the respondent’s purchase decision as the
maximumWTP in a situation where he or she wants to acquire
the good. We measure the sales decision as the minimum
WTA, which represents the compensation value for which
the respondent is being asked to voluntarily give up a good
(Carson, 2000).
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involved in estimating the WTP equation beyond those nor-
mally experienced with survey data (Carson, 2000). Thus, we
specify the CV models as follows:
WTAi ¼ gðDi;Qi; F i;Mi; eiÞ ð2Þ
WTP i ¼ hðDi;Qi; F i;Mi;aiÞ ð3Þ
where WTP represents a farmer’s willingness-to-pay for the
maize characteristics in the purchase model, whereas WTA
represents a farmers’ willingness-to-accept in the sale model.
The covariates in Eqns (2) and (3) are deﬁned as before, with
ei and ai as the respective error terms. We exclude the time
seasonal variable from the vector M, since the SP assumes
an experimental market that occurs only during the lean
season.
(f) Estimation strategy for the stated preference models
Testing the validity of the CV requires including variables
that can help verify the conformity with economic theory
(Mitchell & Carson, 1989) and knowledge of concerned goods
(Carson & Hanemann, 2005). We follow these principles by
including income and saving as covariates in the model.
Similarly, we verify farmers’ knowledge of the good by includ-
ing variables that measure their propensity to sell and to
purchase maize, measured by the ratio of sold/produced
maize, and the ratio of purchased/produced maize.
Furthermore, the combined use of WTA and WTP tests the
convergent validity criteria as proposed by Carson (2000) and
Venkatachalam (2004). Theoretically the diﬀerence between
WTP and WTA should be small and unimportant as long as
income eﬀects and transactions cost are not large (Carson,
2000).
Some households state that they would not purchase or sell
maize with particular levels of insect damage at any price in
the state preference experiment. In this situation the zero price
elicitation is a true measure of a household’s willingness to pay
or accept, and such a response suggests that farmers place a
value of zero on maize of that damage level. Therefore, while
our main models are estimated via OLS, for robustness we
compare the OLS estimates with estimates from a tobit andTable 1. Descriptive stat
Variables Full sample
Mean
=1 if HH participates in lean period (%) –
Maize price (F CFA/kg) –
=1 if HH buys from/sells to a trader (%) –
=1 If HH buys from/sells to a farmer (%) –
=1 if HH buys from/sells to government (%) –
=1 if HH buys from/sells to other partner (%) –
Age 42
Household size 10
Full income ( 10,000 F CFA) 79
Saving ( 10,000 F CFA) 8
Quantity sold (kg) 1,417 7
Quantity purchased (kg) 78
Distance (km) 6
Ration sale/production (%) 41
Ratio purchase/consumption (%) 21
=1 if HH head attended school (%) 37
=1 if HH head is female (%) 10
Note: The symbol (–) indicates Not Applicable; 1 US $ = 512 F CFA at thea double hurdle. The latter two models explicitly deal with a
non-trivial number of zero responses in the dependent
variable. Tables 9 and 10 in Appendix present the results when
the stated preference modes are estimated via tobit and double
hurdle. We ﬁnd that there is no substantive diﬀerence in the
coeﬃcient estimates and standard errors between OLS
and these two alternative estimators, suggesting that OLS
generates reliable coeﬃcient estimates in this context.
Since we ask each farmer to elicit his or her price preferences
for ﬁve categories of maize damage in the state preference
experiment, we end up with ﬁve observations for each
respondent household. We cluster the standard errors at the
individual-level to make them robust to potential serial
correlation and heteroskedasticity.5. RESULTS
(a) Descriptive statistics for revealed preference models
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for the variables used
in the RP analysis. The table shows that only 20% of farmers
participate in sale transactions during the lean period compared
to 44% who purchase maize during the lean period, which is not
surprising. Given the mean purchase price is nearly 50% higher
than the mean sale price, it is likely that farmers pay a higher
price for purchased maize than they receive for maize they sell.
Traders represent the main market partners in both sale and
purchase transactions. Wholesale traders buy maize from farm-
ers mainly during the early post-harvest period, whereas retail
traders operate throughout the entire post-harvest season.
However, retailers are normally the only traders from whom
farmers buy maize in local and district markets.
Table 2 shows the percentage of observed maize sales and
purchases made by smallholders in our sample that falls into
each of the ﬁve levels of damage (0%, 10%, 20%, 30%, and
50%). The table suggests that high quality maize (0% damage)
is the most commonly traded damage level for both sale and
purchase transactions during the early post-harvest period,
as expected. Indeed, maize with 0% damage level represents
53% of 197 sale transactions during the early post-harvest
period and 55% of 75 purchase transactions.istics for the sample
Sale Purchase
Sd. Mean Sd. Mean Sd.
– 20 – 44 –
– 163 56 220 90
– 87 – 77 –
– 4 – 18 –
– 2 – 5 –
– 7 – – –
13 42 13 45 14
6 10 6 9 5
294 69 141 102 456
23 10 27 5 13
,180 2,056 4,262 480 1,111
160 65 145 183 196
5 6 5 6 4
53 60 55 24 28
2 12 22 52 2
– 35 – 36 –
– 9 – 12
time of the survey.
Table 2. Level of insect damage in marketed maize for RP transactions




Early PH Lean Early PH Lean
0% Damage 53 31 54 49
10% Damage 23 49 28 29
20% Damage 11 4 5 10
30% Damage 7 14 5 7
50% Damage 6 2 8 5
Number of observations 197 49 75 59
Note: All columns sum to 100%.
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and above) is somewhat more prevalent during the lean per-
iod. Maize with damage levels greater than zero accounts for
nearly 70% of sale transactions in the lean period, but only
51% of purchase transactions during the same period. How-
ever, there are very few recorded transactions for extremely
damaged maize (50% damage), which suggests that extremely
damaged maize is less marketable.
(b) Descriptive statistics for stated preference models
Table 3 presents the mean price for each level of insect-
damaged maize in the SP and RP models. These results
suggest that as insect damage increases there is a decrease in
farmers’ WTP for purchasing maize, and WTA for selling
maize. Farmers’ price elicitation is also consistent with theory.
The ratio between SP and RP is shown on the far right column
of Table 3. It shows that higher mean value of the WTA rela-
tive to the mean sale price of the RP conﬁrms that the owner
overestimates the value of the maize that he or she will hypo-
thetically sell. Instead, the mean value of the WTP is close to
or lower than the RP mean price for purchases, as expected
(Carson, Flores, Martin, & Wright, 1996).
These results could also indicate that the presence of high
insect damage provides information about unobservable maize
quality that is not accounted for in market transactions. TheTable 3. Price (in F CFA/kg) for diﬀerent levels of insect damage in
revealed preference (RP) and stated preference (SP) models








Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
WTA Sale
0% Damage 214 91 160 54 172 20 1.24
10% Damage 192 88 174 75 171 32 1.12
20% Damage 163 90 164 69 200 00 0.82
30% Damage 154 85 140 43 175 56 0.88
50% Damage 123 81 133 32 167 00 0.74
WTP Purchase
0% Damage 213 83 257 118 206 48 1.03
10% Damage 191 78 217 89 228 91 0.84
20% Damage 165 73 164 55 173 41 0.95
30% Damage 160 73 193 33 204 34 0.78
50% Damage 128 70 158 63 190 69 0.67
Note: SD = Standard deviation; 1 US $ = 512 F CFA at the time of the
survey.
*The ratio considers the lean season value for the RP.ratio SP/RP is above 1 for good maize quality (0% and 10%
damage) for sale transactions. Thus, farmers may believe that
markets do not reward their eﬀorts to preserve maize quality
during the lean season. In this sense when they are asked to
purchase maize in the SP, farmers are willing to pay a fair
price for high maize quality (0% damage) since the ratio SP/
RP is close to 1. However, when insect damage accumulates
they are willing to pay substantially less than what they actu-
ally pay in the RP. These results may suggest that farmers
believe market prices do not reﬂect the true value of maize
quality. 3 The ratio SP/RP for high damage maize is consistent
with this interpretation in sale transactions, as it reveals that
farmers are willing to accept lower prices than what the
markets pay in the RP.
(c) Estimation results for the revealed preference sale model
Table 4 presents the results for the model of factors aﬀecting
prices that farmers receive when selling their maize. Columns
1, 3, and 5 show the parsimonious results where only level
of insect damage and a constant are included in the model,
while columns 2, 4, and 6 show the results with a full set of
controls. The results are generally consistent across speciﬁca-
tions, and indicate that farmers receive price discounts when
they sell insect-damaged maize.
In columns 1 and 2, the dependent variable is the maize
price in F CFA/kg, and the impact of insect damage on maize
price is estimated using a set of 4 dummy variables with 0%
insect damage as the base. The parsimonious regression in
column 1 shows that only the variable for 50% insect damage
is statically signiﬁcant (p value = 0.04). In column 2 the price
discount for maize with insect damage becomes statically
signiﬁcant when insect damage reaches 30% of the sample.
These results suggest that maize buyers tolerate insect damage
as low as 20% during sale transactions without requiring the
maize to be discounted. Farmers whose marketed maize con-
tains 30% insect damage receive about 15 F CFA/kg ($
0.029/kg) less than farmers selling high quality maize (0%
damage). When insect damage reaches 50% of maize sold,
the discount increases to 25 F CFA/kg ($ 0.05) and this eﬀect
is also statistically signiﬁcant (p-value = 0.04).
In column 3 through column 6 of Table 4 we treat the level
of insect damage as a continuous variable to generate a linear
damage slope. The dependent variable is also converted to log
of maize price. The coeﬃcient on the damage slope in columns
3 and 4 suggests that a 10% increase in damage level entails a
3.3–3.4% price discount on average that is statistically signiﬁ-
cant in both speciﬁcations (p-value < 0.05).
Columns 5 and 6 of Table 4 show the results where insect
damage is interacted with the lean period dummy variable,
which allows the damage eﬀects on maize price to vary
between early PH and lean periods. In column 5 the results
indicate that in the early PH period a 10% increase in insect
damage lowers maize price by 4.1% (p-value = 0.01). How-
ever, in the lean period the price discount for insect damage
is minimal as a 10% increase in insect damage reduces the
maize price by just 0.2%, as the joint F-test between the level
of damage coeﬃcient, and the interaction term between the
level of damage and the lean season dummy is statistically sig-
niﬁcant at the 5% level (p-value = 0.03). This ﬁnding provides
evidence to reject hypothesis 2, as the average price discount is
not the same in the early post-harvest period as it is in the lean
period for maize with the same level of damage.
In column 6 the results are very similar as a 10% increase in
insect damage during the early PH period reduces maize price
by 3.7% (p-value = 0.01). But in the lean period a 10%
Table 4. Factors aﬀecting price of sold maize (F CFA/Kg) in the reveled preference model
Dependent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Price Price Log (Price) Log (Price) Log (Price) Log (Price)
Coef P > t Coef P > t Coef P > t Coef. P > t Coef. P > t Coef. P > t
Damage slope 0.34 ** (0.02) 0.33 *** (0.01) 0.41 ** (0.01) 0.37 *** (0.01)
Damage slope * lean period 0.39 (0.16) 0.29 (0.26)
10% Damage 1.35 (0.83) 0.89 (0.88)
20% Damage 13.95 (0.15) 10.91 (0.27)
30% Damage 11.14 (0.28) 14.93 * (0.07)
50% Damage 25.35 ** (0.04) 25.12 ** (0.04)
= 1 if transaction is in lean period 11.03 ** (0.05) 0.10 *** (0.01) 0.10 ** (0.06) 0.07 (0.16)
=1 if HH head attended school 12.81 ** (0.02) 0.07 * (0.07) 0.07 * (0.07)
Age 2.65 * (0.06) 0.02 * (0.07) 0.02 * (0.08)
age square 0.03 * (0.08) 2E04 * (0.10) 2E04 (0.11)
= 1 if HH head is female 7.59 (0.35) 0.02 (0.68) 0.02 (0.68)
Household size 1.32 *** (0.00) 0.01 ** (0.02) 0.01 ** (0.02)
Income ( 10,000 F CFA) 0.04 ** (0.03) 2.E04 *** (0.00) 2.E04 *** (0.01)
Saving ( 10,000 F CFA) 0.26 *** (0.00) 2.E03 *** (0.00) 2.E03 (0.00)
Quantity sold 0.00 (0.80) 4.E06 (0.41) 4E06 (0.41)
Ratio sale/consumption 2.66 (0.68) 0.03 (0.47) 0.03 (0.45)
Ratio purchase/production 0.47 (0.98) 0.03 (0.76) 0.03 (0.82)
Distance from market (Km) 0.97 (0.13) 2.E03 (0.52) 2.E03 (0.51)
= 1 if sold to traders 13.72 (0.31) 0.04 (0.60) 0.03 (0.63)
= 1 if sold to government 14.99 (0.45) 0.07 (0.54) 0.10 (0.36)
= 1 if sold to farmers 24.23 (0.24) 0.14 (0.27) 0.14 (0.28)
Constant 175.53 *** (0.00) 117.40 *** (0.00) 5.17 (0.00) 4.78 *** (0.00) 5.11 *** (0.00) 4.80 *** (0.00)
N 246 246 246 246 246 246
R2 0.43 0.55 0.38 0.51 0.42 0.51
Note: *, **, ***, indicate that corresponding coeﬃcients are statistically signiﬁcant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively; 1 US $ = 512 F CFA at the time of the survey; Department dummies are not






































































122 WORLD DEVELOPMENTincrease in insect damage only reduces maize price by 0.8%, as
the joint F-test between the level of damage coeﬃcient, and the
interaction term between the level of damage and the lean
season dummy is statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level
(p-value = 0.04). These results indicate that the price discount
for lower quality maize is substantial in the early post-harvest
period, but is much smaller in the lean season. This ﬁnding
makes sense as scarcity in the lean season makes people des-
perate, which in turn pushes prices up and makes them care
less about quality. Our results are consistent with Compton
et al.’s (1998) ﬁndings in Ghana that traders tolerate higher
levels of insect damage later in the year when maize became
scarce.
(d) Estimation results for the stated preference sale model
Subsequent tables are presented in the same format as
Table 4, with the speciﬁcations showing a full set of variables
following the corresponding parsimonious speciﬁcations.
The results for the stated preference for sale estimates in
Table 5 suggest that farmers are willing-to-accept a discounted
price for every level of insect damage. Column 1 presents the
parsimonious regression with the dependent variable, price
in F CFA/kg. Results in column 1 indicate that the discount
is statistically signiﬁcant for every level of damage
(p value = 0.00). The price discount is nearly 0.9% for 1%
insect damage, as shown in column 3 where the dependent
variable is log price. In addition, households’ characteristics
have no eﬀect on the discount, since the results of the discount
slope are the same when the full set of variables are introduced
in columns 2 and 4. 4, 5
We also ﬁnd other drivers of farmers’ WTA that can serve
the internal validity test for the SP. For instance, household
size has a negative and statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on price
(p-value < 0.05) in column 2 of Table 5. One possible explana-
tion might be that larger households interact more frequentlyTable 5. Factors aﬀecting price of sold maize (
Dependent variable (1)
Price P
Coef. P > t Coef
Damage slope
10% Damage 20.65 *** (0.00) 20.65
20% Damage 46.52 *** (0.00) 46.52
30% Damage 51.14 *** (0.00) 51.15
50% Damage 78.77 *** (0.00) 78.46
=1 if HH head attended school 3.69
Age 1.74
age square 0.02
=1 if HH head is female 6.64
Household size 1.24
Income ( 10,000 F CFA) 0.01




Distance from market (km) 1.18
Constant 206.79 *** (0.00) 163.06
N 1756
R2 0.43
Note: *, **, ***, indicate that corresponding coeﬃcients are statistically signiﬁca
time of the survey; Department dummies are not shown in the table; the t-test f
is statistically signiﬁcant between each pair comparison.in the market for cash needs to the extent that they provide
more realistic estimation of sale prices.
(e) Estimation results for the revealed preference purchase model
Table 6 indicates that farmers discount prices depending on
the maize quality purchased in markets. In the parsimonious
regression in column 1, the negative signs of the coeﬃcients
are generally what we would expect for a consumer purchasing
low quality maize. But the discount coeﬃcients are marginally
statistically signiﬁcant for 50% damage level (p-value = 0.11).
Controlling for other transaction characteristics in column 2
does not modify substantially the magnitude of the discount
coeﬃcients, but does modify the level of the statistical signiﬁ-
cance. The price discount is no longer signiﬁcant at any level
of insect damage. These results could mean farmers are not
concerned about the quality of purchased maize because they
have little choice but to pay what the market oﬀers when they
run out of stock, regardless of quality.
In columns 3 and 4, we use the log price to determine the
damage slope during purchase transactions. In column 3, the
results indicate that a 10% increase in maize damage lowers
the average price farmers are willing-to-pay by 2.4%, but this
damage slope remains marginally signiﬁcant (p-value = 0.11).
When we account for transaction characteristics in column 4
the discount for a 10% increase in maize damage is 2.6%,
and the statistical signiﬁcance remains marginally signiﬁcant
(p-value = 0.12).
Results from columns 5 and 6 in Table 6 reveal that when
the damage slope is interacted with the lean season dummy,
the discount for purchases in the early post-harvest period is
higher than it is in the lean period. In column 5, a 10% increase
in insect damage translates to a 4.4% reduction in maize price
during the early post-harvest period, but the joint eﬀect
suggests that during the lean period, a 10% increase in insect
damage translates to just a 0.5% decrease on average.F CFA/kg) in the stated preference model
(2) (3) (4)
rice Log (Price) Log (Price)
P > t Coef P > t Coef. P > t






(0.12) 0.01 * (0.07)
(0.13) 0.00 * (0.10)
(0.46) 0.01 (0.66)





* (0.07) 0.01 ** (0.03)
* (0.06) 3E03 (0.38)
*** (0.00) 5.27 *** (0.00) 5.05 *** (0.00)
1756 1698 1698
0.45 0.47 0.48
nt at the 15%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively; 1 US $ = 512 F CFA at the
or diﬀerence between the estimates of the damage levels in columns 1 and 2
Table 6. Factors aﬀecting price of purchased maize (F CFA/kg) in the revealed preference model
Dependent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Price Price Log (Price) Log (Price) Log (Price) Log (Price)
Coef P > t Coef P > t Coef. P > t Coef. P > t Coef. P > t Coef. P > t
Damage slope 0.24 (0.11) 0.26 (0.12) 0.44 * (0.06) 0.45 * (0.06)
Damage slope * lean period 0.39 (0.19) 0.35 (0.23)
10% Damage 0.41 (0.97) 7.42 (0.50)
20% Damage 5.88 (0.65) 15.27 (0.31)
30% Damage 20.48 (0.24) 26.26 (0.20)
50% Damage 22.75 (0.11) 24.95 (0.20)
=1 if transaction is in lean period 5.76 (0.56) 0.01 (0.75) 0.03 (0.56) 0.05 (0.31)
=1 if HH attended school 12.66 (0.20) 0.05 (0.21) 0.05 (0.24)
Age 0.70 (0.70) 0.00 (0.88) 0.00 (0.88)
age square 0.01 (0.69) 0.00 (0.91) 0.00 (0.91)
=1 if HH head is female 39.27 * (0.09) 0.11 (0.12) 0.11 (0.13)
Household size 1.36 (0.11) 5E03 (0.15) 5E03 (0.17)
Income ( 10,000 F CFA) 0.01 (0.35) 7E05 * (0.10) 8E05 * (0.07)
Saving ( 10,000 F CFA) 0.60 *** (0.01) 4E03 *** (0.00) 4E03 *** (0.00)
Quantity purchased (kg) 0.04 (0.23) 2E04 (0.19) 2E04 (0.19)
Ratio sale/production 1.78 (0.92) 0.02 (0.75) 0.03 (0.69)
Ratio purchase/production 1.34 (0.36) 0.01 (0.43) 0.01 (0.38)
Distance from market (km) 3.21 * (0.08) 0.01 (0.12) 0.01 (0.12)
=1 if purchased from other farmers 15.42 (0.24) 0.05 (0.45) 0.05 (0.42)
=1 if purchased from government 140.79 *** (0.00) 0.65 *** (0.00) 0.66 *** (0.00)
Constant 209.76 *** (0.00) 195.11 (0.00) 5.33 (0.00) 5.39 *** (0.00) (5.34) *** (0.00) 5.41 *** (0.00)
N 134 134 134 134 134 134
R2 0.45 0.63 0.51 0.70 0.52 0.71
Note: *, **, ***, indicate that corresponding coeﬃcients are statistically signiﬁcant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively; 1 US $ = 512 F CFA at the time of the survey; Department dummies are not






































































Table 7. Factors aﬀecting price of purchased maize (F CFA/kg) in the stated preference model.
Dependent variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Price Price Log (Price) Log (Price)
Coef P > t Coef P > t Coef. P > t Coef. P > t
Damage slope 0.90 *** (0.00) 0.90 *** (0.00)
10% Damage 23.02 *** (0.00) 23.02 *** (0.00)
20% Damage 51.70 *** (0.00) 51.70 *** (0.00)
30% Damage 58.60 *** (0.00) 58.61 *** (0.00)
50% Damage 90.63 *** (0.00) 90.59 *** (0.00)
=1 if HH head attended school 4.37 (0.46) 0.01 (0.73)
Age 1.79 (0.14) 6E05 (0.99)
Age square 0.02 (0.19) 6E08 (1.00)
=1 if HH head is female 7.58 (0.43) 0.01 (0.74)
Household size 1.12 ** (0.03) 4E03 ** (0.04)
Income( 10,000 F CFA) 0.02 ** (0.02) 7E05 ** (0.04)
Saving ( 10,000 F CFA) 0.03 (0.69) 1E04 (0.76)
Quantity purchased 0.01 (0.65) 4E05 (0.65)
Ratio sale/production 7.95 (0.16) 0.07 *** (0.01)
Ratio purchase/production 1.11 (0.24) 0.02 * (0.06)
Distance from market (km) 0.42 (0.59) 5E04 (0.88)
Constant 180.77 *** (0.00) 152.17 *** (0.00) 5.12 *** (0.00) 5.21 *** (0.00)
N 1756 1756 1620 1620
R2 0.38 0.39 0.51 0.52
Note: *, **, ***, indicate that corresponding coeﬃcients are statistically signiﬁcant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
1 US $ = 512 F CFA at the time of the survey; Department dummies are not shown in the table; the t-test for diﬀerence between the estimates of the
damage levels in columns 1 and 2 is statistically signiﬁcant between each pair comparison.
124 WORLD DEVELOPMENTIn column 6, a 10% increase in insect damage in the early
post-harvest season, reduces maize price by 4.5% on average,
but during the lean period a 10% increase in insect damage
reduces maize price by 1.0% on average. However, we cannot
make strong statistical inference for the price discount during
the lean season in this speciﬁcation because the joint F-test for
the level of damage and the interaction term between level of
damage and the lean season dummy is not statically signiﬁcant
in columns 5 and 6 (p value = 0.17).
Table 6 also provides insights about the eﬀects on purchase
prices of some household and market characteristics. The
eﬀect of household savings is highly signiﬁcant across all
columns of the table, whereas households’ income eﬀect is
signiﬁcant only in the log-linear estimation in columns 4 and
6. The sign of these coeﬃcients shows that wealthier house-
holds pay less for maize quality, but the magnitude of the
eﬀect is small. Farmers who purchase maize from the govern-
ment pay a much lower purchase price and this eﬀect is highly
statistically signiﬁcant. Farmers who have access to the
government market are able to purchase maize at a 65%
discount or on average 140 F CFA lower than the market
average. However, few farmers buy from this market channel
mainly because there are high transport and transaction costs
to access government shops, which are generally located far
from rural villages.(f) Estimation results for the stated preference purchase model
Results in Table 7 show that farmers are willing-to-pay less
for maize that has more damage. In the parsimonious speciﬁ-
cation shown in column 1, the discount is statistically signiﬁ-
cant for every level of insect damage (p-value = 0.00).
Likewise, the quality slope estimation in column 3 shows that
a 10% increase in insect damage generates 9.0% price discount.
We ﬁnd little eﬀect if any of household characteristics on
the quality valuation in the WTP model. Indeed, when we
control for households’ characteristics in columns 2 and 4,
the coeﬃcient on the damage dummies and the damage slopeare almost unchanged compared to their parsimonious regres-
sions in columns 1 and 3, respectively. 6, 7
Table 7 also provides evidence of the internal validity of the
WTP estimation. First, the results are consistent with economic
theory. Wealthier households are likely to elicit a higher
willingness-to-pay for maize quality, even though the income
eﬀect is small. Income elasticity for demand is indeed positive
for maize which is a normal good (Carson & Hanemann,
2005). In contrast, households with more members are willing
to pay less for identical maize quality suggesting that farmers with
higher family expenses might be more price-cautions. Second, the
positive coeﬃcient for the purchase/production ratio indicates
that the more the household depends on purchases for food con-
sumption, the more the household head is willing-to-pay for
maize. Conversely, a household with a larger propensity-to-sell
(denoted by a higher ratio of sales/production) is less willing-to-
pay a high price to consume maize. We also observe a similar
eﬀect for the saving variable most likely because farmers with lar-
ger savings are more likely to be maize sellers than buyers.6. CONCLUSION
This article uses data from a random sample of 360 maize
farmers from Benin to estimate the extent to which insect dam-
age aﬀects the price that farmers’ in SSA receive when they sell
maize and the price that they pay when they purchase maize.
We also test whether or not there is a price discount in the early
post-harvest period when maize is plentiful, compared to the lean
period when maize is scare. This study builds upon a recent
meta-analysis by Aﬀognon et al. (2015) that describes quality loss
as one of the major post-harvest challenges that farmers in SSA
face. The ﬁndings from this study add to the existing literature by
helping to explain why many smallholders in SSA sell maize at
harvest and do not invest in modern storage technology that
can preserve maize quality for later in the post-harvest season.
The main results of this article suggest that there is a price
discount for insect-damaged maize in Benin. The size of the
price discount varies depending on the evaluation method
ESTIMATING PRICE DISCOUNTS FOR LOW-QUALITY MAIZE IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: EVIDENCE FROM BENIN 125(revealed preference vs. stated preference) and side of the mar-
ket transaction (sales vs. purchases). Farmers provide the same
magnitude of price discounts for the WTA and WTP, but the
SP estimates are almost three times those of the RP.
Our RP results for maize sales also provide some evidence to
support the idea that the average price discount is not the
same in the early post-harvest period as it is in the lean period
for maize with the same level of damage. This suggests that
when there is suﬃcient maize on the market immediately after
harvest, people have quality maize available to them and sub-
sequently discount maize that has been damaged by insects.
Conversely, in the lean season people become desperate and
do not have the luxury to select their maize based on quality.
This result is intuitive and it reﬂects the dire food security sit-
uation that many farm households who do not produce
enough food to meet their consumption needs face in the lean
season. Our results are consistent with an earlier stated prefer-
ence focus group study of maize traders in Ghana (Compton
et al., 1998). However, to our knowledge the present study is
the ﬁrst study to empirically quantify this discount using
revealed preference data from smallholder farmers in SSA.
The results of our study also add to other recent studies that
estimate how unobservable maize quality attributes such as aﬂa-
toxins aﬀect a farmer’s market participation decision. Hoﬀmann
and Gatobu (2014) infer that unobservable maize quality attri-
butes might help explain why many farmers in SSA remain
semi-subsistence, and only purchase maize from the market
when necessary. We ﬁnd larger discounts for visibly damaged
grain in the SP compared to the RP models when farmers buy
and sell maize. This suggests that in a hypothetical SP context,
farmers are concerned about visible insect damage and the eﬀect
it has on price, but their observed behavior in the RP experiment
suggests that these discounts may in fact be smaller. We also
ﬁnd that the diﬀerence between SP and RP results is larger at
higher levels of insect damage. This may mean that in a SP sit-
uation farmers associate higher levels of observable insect dam-
age with unobservable quality measures such as aﬂatoxins.
However, the smaller relative damage slope in our RP model
indicates that in situations of food scarcity, such as in the lean
period, even visible characteristics like insect damage matter less
in a household’s decision making process.Our results also indicate that farmers who might otherwise
want to store maize with the intention of selling it in the lean
period, currently have little incentive to invest in eﬀective storage
technologies to preserve quality. Rural maize markets in Benin
seem to have a higher tolerance for lower quality maize in the
lean period, as reported by Aﬀognon et al. (2015). Therefore,
farmers have less incentive to preserve good quality maize to
get a higher price when they sell it. This creates a vicious circle
where farmers do not protect their stored maize from insects,
resulting in large post-harvest losses that further exacerbate
maize scarcity. In turn, the scarcity of maize and prevalence
of insect damage in the lean period means that farmers who
must purchase maize in the lean season for food security will
purchase maize of whatever quality is available in the market.
The results of our study lead to two main recommendations.
First, since price discounts exist in the early post-harvest per-
iod when maize is plentiful, it is important to help farmers
increase productivity and output that will extend the plentiful
season further into the marketing year. Doing so requires pro-
moting the adoption of modern fertilizers and improved seeds
to smallholder farmers along with providing them with better
information on production estimates and prices.
Second, promoting the adoption of improved storage tech-
nology can enhance farmers’ ability to store more good quality
maize at harvest to consume and sell in the lean season. With
an increase in the quantity and quality of maize available in
the lean period, we hypothesize that the price discounts
observed in the early post-harvest period would also become
present in the lean period. As a result, farmers who sell good
quality maize in the lean season will experience an income
gain, which may incentivize them to invest in modern inputs
such as inorganic fertilizer and improved seed the next year.
This relationship has been observed in a recent study in
Malawi (Ricker-Gilbert & Jones, 2015). Adoption of better
storage technology leading to adoption of better production
technology can help break the low maize productivity, and
low maize quality cycle that exists for many smallholder farm-
ers in SSA. In addition, with more maize produced and better
storage technology households are less likely to be forced into
purchasing poor quality maize during the lean season when
food security concerns become acute.NOTES1. The SP approach used in the present study is an open-ended
questionnaire about only one characteristic of a private good that
respondents are very familiar with. Carson and Hanemann (2005) contend
that incentives for strategic behavior, such as cheap talk and free-riding,
are absent for private goods and therefore do not have a diﬀerential eﬀect
on CV for stated preference experiments. Kealy and Turner (1993) ﬁnd
that there is no diﬀerence in WTP with open-ended contingent valuation
and closed-ended contingent valuation for private goods. Mitchell and
Carson (1989) contend that the open-ended CV may work in cases where
the respondents are familiar with the concept of paying for the good.
2. Insect damage takes times to develop, and only becomes apparent one
or two months after harvest (Boxall, 2002).
3. The true value of maize quality corresponds not only to observable but
also unobservable characteristics such as aﬂatoxin. The level of insect damage
can be informative of storage practices from which farmers may assume there
are other unobservable quality issues. Hell, Cardwell, Setamou, and Poehling
(2000) ﬁnd that the mean aﬂatoxin content of maize infested with pests was
signiﬁcantly higher than maize free of pests. Diener et al. (1987) indicate that
the presence of insect damage increases the risk of aﬂatoxin development.4. The estimation with the sample restricted only to maize sellers and
non-sellers does not yield substantial diﬀerence in the magnitude and the
statistical signiﬁcance of the coeﬃcient estimates. These results are
available upon request.
5. There is no substantial change in the magnitude and the statistical
signiﬁcance of the coeﬃcient estimates when individual-level ﬁxed eﬀects
and random eﬀects are used as estimation procedures. Results using these
estimators are available upon request.
6. The estimation with the sample restricted only to maize buyers and
non-buyers does not yield substantial diﬀerence in the magnitude and the
statistical signiﬁcance of the coeﬃcient estimates. These results are
available upon request.
7. There is no substantial change in the magnitude and the statistical
signiﬁcance of the coeﬃcient estimates when individual-level ﬁxed eﬀects
and random eﬀects are used as estimation procedures. Results using these
estimators are available upon request.
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Dependent variable Revealed preference for sales Revealed preference for purchases
Selection equation
(Probit) (1 = HH sold
Maize)
Structural equation
(OLS) (Price F CFA/kg)
Selection equation
(Probit) (1 = HH bougt
Maize)
Structural equation
(OLS) (Price F CFA/
kg)
Coef. P > t Coef. P > t Coef. P > t Coef. P > t
10% Damage 1.79 (0.76) 8.01 (0.51)
20% Damage 11.95 (0.16) 33.63 (0.11)
30% Damage 20.83 ** (0.02) 26.10 (0.24)
50% Damage 18.80 * (0.09) 1.48 (0.95)
=1 if transaction is in lean period 5.63 (0.39) 6.12 (0.60)
=1 if HH head attended school 0.20 (0.23) 18.04 *** (0.00) 0.14 (0.41) 22.65 * (0.09)
Age 0.04 (0.29) 3.16 *** (0.01) 0.03 (0.37) 5.67 ** (0.05)
Age square 3.40E04 (0.36) 0.03 *** (0.01) 3.90E04 (0.30) 0.06 ** (0.05)
=1 if HH head is female 0.33 (0.21) 9.50 (0.33) 0.07 (0.81) 56.53 *** (0.01)
Household size 0.03 ** (0.04) 1.49 *** (0.01) 0.01 (0.69) 1.48 (0.22)
Income( 10,000 F CFA) 2.86E04 (0.37) 0.05 *** (0.00) 2.13E04 (0.55) 0.02 (0.26)
Saving ( 10,000 F CFA) 0.01 * (0.08) 0.22 * (0.09) 3.19E03 (0.43) 0.97 ** (0.03)
Distance from market (km) 0.01 (0.42) 1.19 * (0.08) 0.03 * (0.07) 15.69 (0.49)
Quantity traded (sold/purchased) 9.86E05 (0.90) 0.03 (0.41)
Ratio sale/production 4.07 (0.47) 15.69 (0.49)
Ratio purchase/production 1.77 (0.91) 0.74 (0.71)
=1 if market partner is a traders 28.59 *** (0.00)
=1 if market partner is government 27.34 (0.17) 17.10 (0.23)
=1 if market partner is a farmer 23.85 (0.12) 134.41 *** (0.00)
Exclusion Var. : Area other than maize 0.13 ** (0.05) 0.21 *** (0.00)
Inverse Mills Ratio 2.08 (0.94) 0.21 *** (0.00)




Note: *, **, ***, indicate that corresponding coeﬃcients are statistically signiﬁcant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively;
1 US $ = 512 F CFA at the time of the survey; Department dummies are not shown in the table.Table 9. Robustness check: Alternative estimators used to estimate factors aﬀecting price of sold maize (F CFA/kg) in stated preference model
Double Hurdle
OLS (main results, as
shown in Table 5)
Tobit Hurdle 1: Probit Hurdle 2: Truncated
Regression
Coef. P > t Coef. P > t Coef. P > t Coef. P > t
10% Damage 20.65 *** (0.00) 20.75 *** (0.00) 0.01 (0.24) 19.47 *** (0.00)
20% Damage 46.52 *** (0.00) 46.80 *** (0.00) 0.02 ** (0.05) 44.98 *** (0.00)
30% Damage 51.15 *** (0.00) 51.51 *** (0.00) 0.03 ** (0.02) 48.78 *** (0.00)
50% Damage 78.46 *** (0.00) 79.58 *** (0.00) 0.05 *** (0.00) 71.52 *** (0.00)
=1 if HH head attended school 3.69 (0.44) 3.42 (0.48) 0.03 * (0.06) 8.58 ** (0.03)
Age 1.74 (0.12) 1.78 (0.12) 0.00 (0.79) 1.72 ** (0.04)
Age square 0.02 (0.13) -0.02 (0.14) 0.00 (0.74) 0.02 * (0.06)
= 1 if HH head is female 6.64 (0.46) 6.97 (0.45) 0.03 (0.17) 0.74 (0.91)
Household size 1.24 ** (0.03) 1.32 ** (0.04) 0.00 ** (0.04) 0.80 ** (0.04)
Income( 10,000 F CFA) 0.01 (0.15) 0.01 (0.15) 3E06 (0.85) 0.01 * (0.08)
Saving ( 10,000 F CFA) 0.09 (0.17) 0.09 (0.16) 4E04 (0.22) 0.05 (0.37)
Quantity purchased 5E04 (0.46) 4E04 (0.56) 1E05 * (0.07) 9E04 (0.12)
Ratio sale/production 5.64 (0.23) 6.09 (0.22) 0.03 (0.15) 3.86 (0.30)
Ratio purchase/production 1.25 * (0.07) 1.25 * (0.07) 6E04 (0.86) 1.25 ** (0.05)
Distance from market (Km) 1.18 * (0.06) 1.20 * (0.06) 9E04 (0.69) 1.12 ** (0.05)
Constant 163.06 *** (0.00) 162.62 *** (0.00)
N 1,756 1756 1756 1698
R2 or Pseudo R2 0.45 0.05 0.17 1042.5a
Note: *, **, ***, indicate that corresponding coeﬃcients are statistically signiﬁcant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively; aindicates the value for Wald
Chi2; 1 US $ = 512 F CFA at the time of the survey; Department dummies are not shown in the table.
Table 10. Robustness check: Alternative estimators used to estimate factors aﬀecting price of purchased maize (F CFA/kg) in stated preference model
Double Hurdle
OLS (main results, as
shown in Table 7)
Tobit Hurdle 1: Probit Hurdle 2: Truncated
Regression
Coef. P > t Coef. P > t Coef. P > t Coef. P > t
10% Damage 23.02 *** (0.00) 23.50 *** (0.00) 0.04 *** (0.02) 21.27 *** (0.00)
20% Damage 51.70 *** (0.00) 53.47 *** (0.00) 0.10 *** (0.00) 47.78 *** (0.00)
30% Damage 58.61 *** (0.00) 60.46 *** (0.00) 0.10 *** (0.00) 54.15 *** (0.00)
50% Damage 90.59 *** (0.00) 94.76 *** (0.00) 0.15 *** (0.00) 83.71 *** (0.00)
=1 if HH head attended school 4.37 (0.46) 5.01 (0.44) 0.02 (0.52) 4.04 (0.46)
Age 1.79 (0.14) 2.02 (0.12) 0.01 (0.14) 1.65 (0.13)
Age square 0.02 (0.19) 0.02 (0.17) 6E05 (0.21) 0.01 (0.18)
=1 if HH head is female 7.58 (0.43) 7.60 (0.45) 4E03 (0.92) 7.00 (0.42)
Household size 1.12 ** (0.03) 1.21 ** (0.03) 3E03 (0.27) 1.03 ** (0.02)
Income( 10,000 F CFA) 0.02 ** (0.02) 0.02 ** (0.02) 2E06 (0.94) 0.02 ** (0.02)
Saving ( 10,000 F CFA) 0.03 (0.69) 0.04 (0.69) 2E05 (0.96) 0.03 (0.69)
Quantity purchased 0.01 (0.65) 0.01 (0.56) 2E04 (0.19) 0.01 (0.65)
Ratio sale/production 7.95 (0.16) 7.62 (0.21) 0.02 (0.61) 7.34 (0.16)
Ratio purchase/production 1.11 (0.24) 1.79 * (0.10) 0.01 *** (0.00) 1.03 (0.24)
Distance from market (km) 0.42 (0.59) 0.35 (0.67) 2E03 (0.36) 0.39 (0.59)
Constant 152.17 (0.00) 147.64 (0.00)
N 1,756 1756 1756 1756
R2 or Pseudo R2 0.39 0.04 0.12 651.05a
Note:*, **, ***, indicate that corresponding coeﬃcients are statistically signiﬁcant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively; aindicates the value for Wald
Chi2; 1 US $ = 512 F CFA at the time of the survey; Department dummies are not shown in the table.
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